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Watchdogs, Helpers or Protectors? – Internal Auditing in Malaysian Local Government 
  
Abstract  
 
This paper examines internal auditor roles to support public governance in a developing 
country context, through interviews with chief audit executives across 17 Malaysian Local 
Government Authorities. Drawing on critical theory, the research shows that internal auditors 
seek to legitimise their position through compliance (watchdog) and performance (helper and 
protector) audits. At the micro level of practices, in performing these dual roles, internal 
auditors are not colonised by governance rules and managerial influence, but instead are 
enabled by them to perform communicative action. Nevertheless, this was undermined by 
financial and managerial capacity issues that are a challenge in developing countries.  
 
Keywords: Critical Theory, Emancipatory Accounting, Internal Audit, Governance, Local 
Government Authorities, Malaysia, Developing Countries 
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1. Introduction  
  
Following the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, a significant issue for public service 
organisations is the importance of good governance (Ferry & Ahrens, 2016). Importantly, 
good governance has increasingly ‘come to be seen as a critical element for sustainable 
development’ (Siddiquee, 2006, p. 343), extending earlier accountability, environmental and 
ethical concerns regarding institutions and organisations (Burritt & Lehman, 1995; Fiedler & 
Lehman, 1995). The GFC highlighted deficiencies of the process of governance and 
governmental regulatory mechanisms and the need for structural change in the public sector 
(Peters, Pierre, & Tiina, 2011). This is even more pertinent in developing countries such as 
Malaysia (the focus of this study), where systemic shocks can often have greater impacts on 
the economy and society, leading to vulnerability in managing financial and managerial 
capacity. Recognising this, and the increased concern with corporate governance and 
accountability in the public sector more generally (Ahrens & Ferry, 2015; Bovens, Gooding, 
& Schillemans, 2014; Ferry, Murphy, Zakaria, & Zakaria, 2015; Grossi & Pianezzi, 2016), 
this study aims to provide empirical evidence of the development in public sector governance 
practice, from an internal audit perspective, in Malaysia (see Ferry, Zakaria, & Eckersley, 
2014), and the challenges faced, in a developing country context.   
 
Generally, the auditing profession, including internal audit, has an important role to play in 
the structural change of public services, particularly in promoting compliance and 
performance in the ways public resources are managed (Ferry & Murphy, 2017). This can 
include acting as watchdogs, helpers and protectors of management as well as being an 
independent advisor to government. These form part of the many roles that auditing 
practitioners play in supporting the governance structure of public sector organisations. 
Nevertheless, in framing the expertise and independence of the auditing profession in the 
eyes of the general public, there has been a substantial focus on the compliance audit 
(Zakaria, Selvaraj, & Zakaria, 2006), but less focus on their roles in providing good 
governance (Roussy, 2013; Tremblay & Gendron, 2011). Local Government Authorities 
(LGAs) are often given extensive power, and hence the importance of examining governance 
within the public sector and the role played by internal auditors.  
 
The auditors’ role in helping to ensure the governance infrastructure (Asare, 2009) is 
specifically critical in developing countries (such as Malaysia) that have shifted to a New 
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Public Management (NPM)1 approach. NPM is not only a legitimate platform for increasing 
accounting colonisation of public sector practices (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2013, Laughlin, 
1987) but also a mechanism of moving public sector services within an audit society (Power, 
1997).  For instance, ideas about performance and efficiency have become increasingly 
influential in the public sector as a result of facts building and expertise of public sector 
auditors (Gendron, Cooper, & Townley, 2007). Importantly, for this paper, the GFC and 
subsequent fallout brought the crucial role of internal audit with regard to governance in the 
public sector firmly to the forefront of international practitioner guidance (CIPFA, 2010, 
2012; IFAC & CIPFA, 2014). For instance, CIPFA (2010) highlighted the importance of 
internal audit to a whole system approach of public financial management for good 
governance. Extending this work, IFAC and CIPFA (2014) have each stressed the importance 
of internal audit to ensure all actions are in the public interest in their international public 
governance code.  
 
In prior accounting research, Roussy (2013), in her study of Quebec, highlights that the 
government identified internal auditing as the crucial function in promoting good governance. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies of internal auditing in the public sector have thus far 
discussed governance as part of studying internal auditing in general. These include studies 
that investigate the factors influencing the effectiveness of internal auditors in public sectors 
(Mihret & Yismaaw, 2007), sourcing of internal audit functions (Caplan & Kirschenheiter, 
2000; Rittenberg & Covaleski, 2001, Spekle, Elten, & Kruis, 2007) and structuring of internal 
audit functions (Archambeault, DeZoort, & Holt, 2008; Miguel & Govindarajan, 1984, 
Norman, Rose, & Rose, 2010). While some researchers have started to examine the ways in 
which internal auditors interpret their roles in the context of providing good governance in 
the public sector (Roussy, 2013), the focus on how internal auditors interpret the concept of 
good governance in the light of their own roles (Tremblay and Gendron, 2011) remains 
limited. Our interest in this study is how internal auditors critically regard their role(s) as 
providing support to good governance.  
 
                                                          
1 New Public Management is an attempt to make public sector management and accountability processes more 
like the private sector through employing doctrines of markets, managerialism, and performance management. 
This was evident in doctrines wanting more emphasis on visible hands-on top management, explicit formal 
measurable standards and measures of performance and success, and greater emphasis on output controls (Ferry, 
Eckersley, & Zakaria, 2015; Hood, 1991, 1995). 
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We acknowledge that gaps in the meaning of good governance may exist between regulators 
and internal auditors (Tremblay & Gendron, 2011). However, we suggest that internal 
auditors can reflect on the external rules and understand organisational activities as a basis for 
exhortations that can be extended through communicative action with management as a 
potential means towards transformation and emancipation (even if exhortations do not 
ultimately lead to action). Key to the successful exhortation is the auditor’s ability to 
demonstrate professional identity as an independent expert to management (Gendron et al., 
2007).  
 
The attempt to maintain professional identity, that is coherent with the individual’s own 
conception of being ‘a professional’, has been examined in critical accounting research 
especially in the context of the auditing profession (Anderson-Gough, Grey, & Robson, 2001; 
Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian, & Sayan, 1998; Haynes, 2008; Kosmala & Herrbach, 2006). 
Foucault’s (1988) notion of ‘technology of self’ (in Foucault, Martin, Gutman, & Hutton, 
1988) has been widely used in such research. For instance, to interpret the auditors’ 
judgement of their professional self within broader regimes of discourses and disciplinary 
actions (Covaleski et al., 1998; Townley, 1995), and in securing more empowerment and 
self-fulfilment in their jobs (Kosmala & Herrbach, 2006). Such Foucauldian based studies 
have informed our understanding of the ways in which the disciplinary powers constitute 
auditors’ subjectivities, partly created through socialisation in the work place (Anderson-
Gough et al., 2001; Kornberger, Justesen, & Mouritsen, 2011). Habermas shares Foucault’s 
concern on the practice of normalisation and surveillance (Power & Laughlin, 1996), within 
which linguistic action forms a technology of governance (Miller & Rose, 1990). However, 
in a Habermasian context, the theoretical insight is more inclined towards understanding the 
ways in which ordinary language can be a tool for meaningful interaction between people 
(Edgar, 2006).  For Habermas, language is critical in understanding human actions. 
Following this, the distinction between strategic and communicative action is key to 
understanding whether a speech act is able to reach consensus and co-ordinate actions 
(Baxter, 1987). In the context of the present study, Habermasian analysis of communicative 
action is particularly useful in understanding how the day to day processes of internal 
auditing, which based on professional strategic actions, may have the potential to be 
communicative actions that enable management to co-ordinate actions for better governance 
of LGAs. 
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In the context of public sector corporate governance, and colonising accounting rules, we are 
interested in explaining the role of internal auditors with regards to their emancipatory 
practices. Rather than draw on traditional macro-historical emancipatory approaches, we 
instead look at ongoing micro practices of emancipation in everyday life through employing 
critical theory (Masquefa, Gallhofer, & Haslam, 2016). Our paper assumes that any research 
aimed at mediating human emancipation potential necessitates an ontological position 
ascribing some capacity for agency and reflexivity to human beings, widely accepted in 
critical accounting and management studies (see e.g., Alvesson & Willmott, 1992; Broadbent 
& Laughlin, 2013; Cooper & Hopper, 2007; Fournier & Grey, 2000; Laughlin, 1987; 
Masquefa et al., 2016). However, a diversity of opinions exists as to whether critical 
accounting research has been successful in engendering emancipation potential and how this 
may be brought about (see e.g., Bebbington, Brown, Frame, & Thomson, 2007; Brown & 
Dillard, 2013; Cooper, 2005; Cooper, Coulson, & Taylor, 2011; Cooper & Coulson 2014; 
Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; Neu, Cooper, & Everett, 2001; Sikka & Willmott, 2005; Tinker, 
2005). The latter issues are however beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
For this study, and its focus in a developing country environment, Malaysia provides an 
appropriate country context due to a number of factors. These include its adoption of NPM in 
common with other developing countries (see Siddiquee, 2006 for a detailed historical 
review), its growth experience and the need for public sector management. Of specific 
importance, following the GFC there was recognition that good governance of the public 
sector in Malaysia was strategically important for its socio-economic recovery and future 
economic growth (Ferry et al., 2014; Ferry, Zakaria, Zakaria, & Slack, 2017). More recently, 
the World Bank (2016) draws attention to the Malaysian experience as relevant for ‘emerging 
economies in Asia, Africa and elsewhere that are transitioning…into shared prosperity’. 
Specifically, the World Bank (2016) contends this experience includes front-line service 
delivery embracing public sector governance that this study is specifically concerned with. 
Within Malaysia, there exist three tiers of LGAs, of which by far the largest in terms of 
budget, population and services provided, and arguably the most influential politically, are 
the large city and municipal councils on which this study is based. Through in-depth semi-
structured interviews of internal auditors in both city and municipal LGAs in Malaysia, we 
critically analyse the role(s) of internal auditors in relation to governance in the public sector.  
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Based upon this, we suggest that internal auditors can retain an enabling (and in some cases 
‘emancipatory’) potential. This is through their ‘exhortations’ from reflection and 
understanding of their everyday activities. We also highlight that their ability to transform 
and emancipate cannot be achieved solely by internal auditors themselves. Indeed, they do 
not have the power to take such actions, as these remain an overall authority management 
responsibility. Improving accountability and ensuring actions are in the public interest 
therefore remains an exhortation to encourage or urge someone to do something. This is not 
an instrumental action per se, but a ‘communicative action’ that is fundamentally co-
operative undertaken by individuals based upon mutual deliberation and argumentation 
(Habermas, 1984, 1987). The internal auditors’ professional role is therefore as a (great) 
exhorter, who looks to extend exhortations through communicative action practices.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The second section reviews relevant 
literature on internal auditing and establishes the theoretical framework for our empirical 
analysis. The third section describes the setting of our field work and provides a background 
description of LGAs in Malaysia. This is followed by section four which covers the research 
methods employed in this study. In section five, we present the narratives from the empirical 
data and highlight the ways in which internal auditors contribute to the governance of LGAs 
in Malaysia. Finally, in section six, we discuss our findings and provide conclusions in terms 
of the contributions from this study considering its managerial and wider implications. We 
also highlight future research needs emerging from this study, as well as recognising the 
limitations of the current research, specifically in relation to the context of the study, its 
generalisability and the research approach adopted. 
 
2. Internal Auditing and Emancipation 
 
Studies on the governance roles of internal auditors have been mainly directed towards 
understanding the influence of corporate governance mechanisms in enabling their role 
(Ferry & Ahrens, 2016). There are two main strands of literature that seek to discuss the roles 
of internal auditors in supporting good governance. Firstly, those studies that focus on the 
relationship between internal auditors and audit committees (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, 
& Neal, 2009; Davies, 2009; Gendron & Bedard, 2006; Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007; 
Sarens, De Beelde, & Everaert et al., 2009). In particular, such studies have explored the 
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activities through which internal auditors support the audit committee functions such as 
providing a sense of  ‘comfort’ to the audit committee (Sarens et al., 2009) or support 
management at the expense of the audit committee (Roussy, 2013). Secondly, those studies 
that have examined the structuring of internal audit functions. For instance, in examining 
reporting lines of internal auditors and considering implications for the independence of 
internal auditors (Archabeault et al., 2008; Christopher, Sarens, & Leung, 2009; Miguel & 
Govindarajan, 1984, Norman et al., 2010).  
 
These prior studies are notable in fleshing out the interplay between internal auditors and 
other governance mechanisms such as audit committees or external auditors (Schneider, 
2010). In contrast, less attention has been devoted to the ways in which internal auditors have 
mobilised the concept of good governance in the performance of their roles. Such a 
consideration may have some enabling (if not emancipatory) potential (Ahrens, 2008; Ahrens 
& Chapman, 2004). Emancipation has its roots in critical theory, which itself has foundations 
in Marxism and an emphasis on hermeneutic science as a methodological approach. This is 
reflected in its four key characteristics: reflection, understanding, transformation, and 
emancipation (Outhwaite, 1996; Finlayson, 2005). These four fundamental characteristics are 
summarised by Chua (2004, p. 259): ‘A critical theory, then, is a reflective theory which 
gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and emancipation.’ 
 
In this context, Laughlin (1987, p. 482) suggests the use of critical theory in empirical 
accounting research is a consequence of ‘the view that the present is not satisfactory [and] 
that reality could be better than it is’. A focus on the way accounting affects both individuals 
and the common good is fundamental to this view and the search for improvement 
(Broadbent & Laughlin, 2013; Lehman, 2007, 2013). Power (2013) notes Laughlin’s (1987) 
extension of Habermas to accounting and organisational contexts. The emphasis on 
reflection, understanding, transformation, and emancipation that is at the heart of critical 
theory, has also lent itself to considerable use in empirical accounting research (Broadbent & 
Laughlin, 2013; Dillard & Bricker, 1992; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; Jonsson & Macintosh, 
1997; Oakes & Berry, 2009; Power, 1991). Two broad aspects of the application of critical 
theory to accounting have been identified (Tilling & Tilt, 2004). Firstly, critical theory allows 
accounting and accounting practice to be situated in and understood in its wider societal 
context. Secondly, in terms of accounting colonisation, the use of critical theory is a call to 
participate in the transformation of accounting and its role in society. From this, our paper 
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suggests human beings, and in our case internal auditors, consider themselves and their 
practices in relation to their social context, that is local government. Without such a capacity, 
internal auditors would have few opportunities to change the conditions affecting their lives 
and will reproduce dominant social orders.  
 
Arising from this is the epistemological implication for ourselves as researchers to adopt a 
position that assists groups and individuals in reflexively engaging with the world as a means 
of engendering emancipation potential (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992; Laughlin, 1987; Neu et 
al., 2001; Roslender & Dillard, 2003). In this sense, we appreciate that the accounting 
literature has stressed the power of accounting to colonise practices through coercive 
institutional processes and affect human behaviour (Laughlin, 1987), including within the 
public sector (Broadbent & Laughlin, 1998). Accounting is implicated in every aspect of 
organisational life (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2013) to the extent that it can colonise 
organisations and has significantly influenced the behaviour of those that work in them. In 
particular, accounting colonisation studies drawing on Habermas have suggested that 
regulative steering mechanisms of accounting follow societal requirements. In contrast, 
constitutive steering mechanisms fail to reflect the values, traditions and norms of the society 
(Broadbent, Jacobs, & Laughlin, 2001; Broadbent, Laughlin, & Read, 1991; Power & 
Laughlin, 1996) and have a potential to colonise as they reflect the values and norms of the 
technical system, rather than society (Dillard & Yuthas, 2006). Power and Laughlin (1996) 
and Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) draw on Habermas’s discussion of the steering media of 
law to illustrate how constitutive and complex steering media can lead to colonisation.  
Indeed, accounting as a set of rules in organisations can colonise organisational life. 
However, due to increasing formalisation and abstraction of this regulative intent (Power & 
Laughlin, 1996) accounting that is intended to be regulative becomes constitutive and 
embedded in organisational life. Crucially in the context of accounting, and especially with 
regards to emancipation, ‘the participants lose the capacity to question and criticise because 
they lack the ability to formulate alternatives’ (Dillard & Yuthas, 2006, p. 212). 
 
We recognise that colonisation studies have shown that accounting can be instrumental and 
communicative in the public sector in enabling ways (Oakes & Berry, 2009). More 
specifically, accounting can be enabling through its emancipatory potential (Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 2003). This is critical to the idea that accounting can, if not ensure, at least exhort if 
actions are undertaken in the public interest such as by internal auditors. Emancipation 
 
 
9 
studies have provided important insights into the potential of accounting but have tended 
towards a macro-level emphasis (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003, 2006), although some 
commentators have argued for its extension to examine micro-level processes engendering its 
emancipation potential (e.g., Alvesson & Willmott, 1992; Broadbent & Laughlin, 2013; 
Laughlin, 1987; Masquefa et al., 2016). As noted by Broadbent et al. (2001), Habermas’s 
model of how steering media interact with the societal life-world does not explicitly attend to 
deep-seated cognitive processes implicated in the generation of institutional persistence and 
change. However, even in their case, it is difficult to discern any deeper concerns with how 
such processes shape more subjectively held views of the world at the individual level of 
analysis.  
 
An important dimension of micro-level processes has therefore been relatively unexplored 
that might otherwise enhance our understanding of how social actors may attempt to 
emancipate themselves from institutional constraints and how efforts to this end become  
implicated in struggles for domination and power (Cooper, Ezzamel, & Willmott, 2008; 
Masquefa et al., 2016). Issues of socialisation and professional identity (Anderson-Gough et 
al., 2001, Kornberger et al., 2011) are examples of the ongoing micro-level activities that 
auditors may face in carrying out their job. Indeed, studies have shown how the attempt to 
balance the role as a protector to management and upholding professional independence is 
not unique to the auditing profession, but has been a common challenge for the accounting 
profession in general. Studies have shown that management accountants were expected by 
the management to perform a variety of roles that could draw them further from the 
professional prescriptions for being an accountant, often referred to as a competition between 
the traditional role of book-keeping (Friedman & Lyne, 1997; Granlund & Lukka, 1998) or a 
more business oriented role (Baxter & Chua, 2008; Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Morales & 
Lambert, 2013). They are expected by management to be an internal consultant (Burns & 
Vaivio, 2001; Coad, 1999; Mouritsen 1996), business advocate (Jablonsky, Keating, & 
Heian, 1993) or business partner (Byrne & Pierce, 2007; Järvenpää, 2007; Lambert & 
Sponem, 2011).  
 
In contrast to research that considers emancipatory potential in a macro-historical context 
(Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006), and in the spirit of Cooper et al. (2008) and Masquefa et al. 
(2016), we aim in this paper to consider a current issue of micro-level processes engendering 
emancipation. We do this through critically analysing the role of internal auditors in helping 
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to fulfil the governance of LGAs. This is in terms of internal auditor enabling tendencies to 
ensure often conflicting actions of compliance and performance are communicated in the 
name of (if not always in) the public interest, against both external colonising rules from 
government and internal management pressure to conform to their will. To this end, we will 
adopt Harbemas’s notion of communicative action in interpreting the data.  
 
Habermas explains, ‘I shall speak of communicative action whenever the actions of the 
agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through 
acts of reaching understanding. In communicative action participants are not primarily 
oriented to their own individual success; they pursue their individual goals under the 
condition that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation 
definition. In this respect the negotiation of definitions of the situation is an essential element 
of the interpretive accomplishments required for communicative action.’ (Habermas, 1984; 
page 285-286). 
 
For Habermas, communicative action entails the interaction and relationship between two or 
more individuals through the use of ordinary language where parties to the interaction 
establish shared understandings and the intention of the speaker is made explicit or avowed. 
The shared understandings and avowed intentions are the criteria that differentiate 
communicative action with linguistically mediated strategic action (Edgar, 2006). Habermas 
categorises strategic actions into concealed strategic action and open strategic action. 
Concealed strategic action occurs when the speaker pursues non-avowable intentions, such as 
to influence the other parties to buy in the speaker’s ideas. In open strategic action, a speaker 
may make explicit their intentions, but still acts strategically in order to encourage or 
influence the other parties to share their views, such as in the case of exhortations. Habermas 
explains that in the case of open strategic actions, the criteria of acceptability needs to be 
fulfilled before any speech acts can be considered as a communicative action. Habermas 
suggests that to understand a speech act is to know the condition under which the claim of 
utterance will be acceptable (Baxter, 1987, p. 42). One condition for the acceptance of an 
utterance is that the hearer knows how to respond to the utterance, either to act or not to act, 
and the speaker’s validity of claim, that is a claim to truth, truthfulness or rightness, is 
criticisable. In a more normatively authorised speech act, that is when the speaker makes a 
request by referring to accepted norms in a given context. The condition of acceptability is 
established when the hearer knows how to respond in order to fulfil the request, and the basis 
 
 
11 
of the speaker’s request, such as the legality of the procedures and the authority of the 
speaker to make such a request. The normatively authorised speech act would however 
constitute communicative actions when the speaker has an obligation to provide reasons and 
justifications for a validity claim, and the hearer can oppose the validity claim by criticism or 
reasons, such as challenging the legality of the instructions. According to Habermas, the act 
of providing and giving reasons for the validity claim constitutes rational potential to 
communicative action (Ibid, p. 45).  
 
In the context of this study, Habermasian analysis of communicative action is useful in 
analysing the dual roles performed by internal auditors. On the one hand, the traditional 
compliance role requires the internal auditor to communicate strategically; on the other hand, 
the role as helper or protector to management enables the internal auditor to exercise the 
communicative potential of their works. Core to these Habermasian ideas is to understand the 
ways in which day to day interactions can lead to emancipation. The study of how internal 
auditors carry out their governance roles as part of everyday activities in LGAs is illustrative 
of critical theory. That is the capacity of internal auditors to engage others in their context in 
rational arguments that could reduce the effect of distortion of information due to effect of 
political inequalities in the society (Edgar, 2006). For example, in a macro-historical context, 
government circulars may constitute communicative action that draw global understandings 
of good governance, but the audience of this circular would not have direct interactions with 
the government. A focus on micro-level processes may provide insight into how the circular 
coordinates actions among individuals with diverse interests in order to reach shared 
understandings of what good governance looks like in their context. 
 
The next section will describe the context of this study followed by the methodology adopted. 
 
3. Local Government Authorities in Malaysia   
 
To provide a contextual background, the salient points regarding the role of LGAs in 
Malaysia are now outlined. Malaysian LGAs are under the purview of the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government. Local government administration is the third tier of 
government in Malaysia with responsibility for handling local issues, namely the obligatory 
and discretionary functions, that have been given to them by Federal Government through the 
State Government. Local government in Malaysia is made up of three categories comprising 
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city councils, municipal councils and district councils. The most significant of these are city 
councils, being those former municipal councils that have been upgraded to city status upon 
fulfilment of several criteria; two of which are total residents exceeding 100,000 and revenue 
collection exceeding RM20 million per annum. Municipal councils relate to an urban locality 
with residents exceeding 100,000 and revenue collection exceeding RM5 million per annum. 
Finally (and outside the scope of this research), the much smaller size District councils are in 
rural-based localities with residents less than 100,000 and less than RM5 million revenue 
collections per annum. In summary, city councils are those responsible for major cities such 
as Kuala Lumpar City Hall; municipal councils for municipalities such as Ampang Jaya 
Municipal Council and finally the large rural areas, albeit financially small, in relation to the 
district councils such as Hulu Selangor District Council.  
 
Local governments are given extensive power under the Local Government Act 1976 
covering mandatory functions (such as refuse collection, street lighting and activities 
pertaining to public health) as well as discretionary functions (such as providing and 
maintaining recreational parks, housing, and commercial activities). The Local Government 
Act 1976 grants roles and authority for local government in Malaysia with respect to a range 
of functions. These include local planning, licensing, the power to impose certain taxes, 
undertake building, housing and commercial construction, the power to perform urban 
planning and management functions, traffic management and control including public 
transport, and the power to plan and provide public utilities. Several other laws such as the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1976 and the Street, Drainage and Building Act 1974 allow 
local authorities to assume more developmental functions in urban management as well as 
undertake a more dynamic role in national development. The Local Government Act 1976 
also specifies the setting up and terms of several committees, including the Audit Committee 
that oversees an LGA’s core functions.  
 
Similar to other internal auditor functions in Federal and State government, internal auditors 
in LGAs follow treasury circulars in discharging their duties. The establishment of an internal 
audit function in Malaysian public sector organisations including LGAs is based on circular 
number 2/79, subsequently superseded by treasury circular number 9/2004. This circular 
provides guidelines as to the role and function of internal audit within public sector 
organisations. According to circular 9/2004, the objective of an internal audit function is to 
assist a public sector organisation to achieve its goals by assessing the effectiveness of 
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internal control and governance processes. This circular also points to the importance of co-
operation between internal and external auditors in order to improve the effectiveness of 
governance processes, financial management, and accountability in public sector 
administration. The focus on supporting effective governance processes is consistent with the 
Performance Standard 2110 of the Institute of Internal Auditors’ International Professional 
Practices Framework. This standard requires internal audit activities to assess and make 
appropriate recommendations for improving the governance processes, such as helping to 
ensure effective organisational performance management and accountability. 
 
4. Research Method 
 
As of August 2013, there were 1492 LGAs in Malaysia. However, there are distinct 
differences in the rules and regulations governing LGAs in Peninsular West Malaysia 
compared to those in East Malaysia. Thus, to ensure consistency in the research data from the 
interviews, the primary data was focused upon the larger region of Peninsular West Malaysia 
(with roughly 80% of the national population and economy) where there are 99 LGAs 
compared to 50 in the East Malaysia region. Of the three levels of LGAs; city councils, 
municipal councils and district councils, this study focuses only on the first two categories of 
councils. City and municipal councils have far higher budgetary and population importance, 
and reflective of this, their internal audit departments are much larger, compared to the 
smaller district councils. As such, activities within the internal audit department activities 
(interactions with auditees and number of audit programmes approved annually) are far more 
prevalent in the far larger city and municipal councils. Indeed, district councils normally only 
employ two to three members of staff in the internal audit department.  
 
As it was envisaged that interviews would be the primary data collection instrument, prior to 
contacting any of the city and municipal LGA’s, ethical approval processes at the respective 
universities of the research team members were fully complied with. Within this process, it 
was made clear that all participants would be free to withdraw from the research at any stage 
prior to the interviews or have their interviews redacted if they so requested. The research 
team then contacted, by telephone, all of the city (nine in total) and municipal (33 in total) 
                                                          
2 http://www.epbt.gov.my/osc/PBT2_index.cfm?Neg=00&Taraf=0&S=2 (accessed on 20th August  
2013) 
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councils. Formal written invitations were then sent to Chief Audit Executives (CAE) by email 
to re-affirm the purpose and main aims of the research. This also covered their voluntary 
consent to participate in the research interviews and their anonymity in the research.  
 
The CAE is a senior position in each LGA, reporting directly to the Head of the LGA and the 
audit function is independent from all other functional areas of the LGA. For this research, 
the views from CAE are important for two reasons. Firstly, the size of the internal audit 
function in most of the LGAs often comprises of five to six non-executive level auditors who 
focus on certain audit areas. Thus, to get comprehensive views on the governance role of 
internal auditors, perspectives from the CAE are crucial. Secondly, the CAE would ordinarily 
be the most appropriate candidate to interview due to their involvement in major decisions in 
the organisation by virtue of their participation in senior management meetings. Hence, we 
sought, wherever possible, to interview the CAE whilst recognising that due to timings and 
logistics this may not always be possible.  
 
Following this invitation, the CAE’s of six city councils (67%) and 11 municipal councils 
(33%) agreed to participate in the research. Further follow-up calls were made to municipal 
councils to try to increase their participation but none were forthcoming beyond the original 
11 who had agreed to take part. The higher proportion of city councils in the interview 
sample is however reflective of their greater size compared to municipal councils. Thus, from 
a total of 42 city and municipal councils in Peninsula West Malaysia, 17 (overall 41%) 
LGA’s agreed to participate in the research.  
 
In total, 18 respondents, across the 17 confirmed LGAs, were involved in this study, one 
interviewee in each LGA except in one municipal LGA where two participants were 
interviewed (the CAE and the Deputy CAE) 3. On two occasions, due to CAE availability at 
the time of the scheduled interview, the researchers interviewed an alternate senior member 
of the audit function. Both senior members were nominated by the CAE; one was the Deputy 
CAE and another was the Acting CAE who was covering for the CAE who was about to 
retire at the time of conducting the interviews. Both these senior alternates were involved 
extensively in the audit planning and supervisory roles of the audit activities. The final 
                                                          
3 Three additional interviews were also conducted with CAEs of district councils. They all confirmed the small 
scale of their operations in comparison to city and municipal councils. Whilst no significant differences were 
noted in terms of audit process, due to their size, as well as the small number of interviews, the data is not 
included within the findings of the study.  
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sample of 18 interviews (across the 17 LGAs) compares well to other qualitative interview-
based research (Barker, Hendry, Roberts, & Sanderson, 2012; Campbell & Slack, 2011; 
Coram, Mock, & Monroe, 2011; Solomon, Solomon, Norton, & Joseph, 2011). 
 
For the interviews, a semi-structured interview research approach was purposively designed 
to help obtain a richness of research data and to provide a meaningful understanding of the 
views of participants. In our case this was from the senior level of the internal audit function 
across the LGAs. Employing this method also enabled interviewees some degree of freedom 
to explain and elaborate on their thoughts and relevant experiences (Barker, 1998; Beasley et 
al., 2009; Jones & Solomon, 2010). Each interview had a common purpose to explore the 
perceptions of CAEs towards their role as internal auditors in the governance process. To 
help with the reliability of the data collected in the interview process, an interview guide, 
based on the prior literature and LGA practice, was used to provide a consistent framework 
and commonality of topic coverage in each interview (see e.g. Campbell & Slack, 2011). All 
the interviews followed the same format. 
 
At the start of each interview, the researchers again provided an overview of the research and 
their role as information gatherers, with a resolute position of neutrality on the issues 
associated with governance, so that the interviewee would be inclined to speak openly and 
honestly on their role and the issues of governance. All interviews were undertaken between 
August and December 2013. The majority of the interviews lasted between fifty minutes to 
one hour. The interviews were generally conducted by one or two of the research team in a 
face-to-face meeting with each participant in their own office. With participants’ permission, 
each interview was digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed.  
 
Whilst the findings are based on the evidence from the interviews, to further triangulate 
internal auditors’ perceptions, LGA documentation was also reviewed including council 
minutes, audit reports, audit file notes, annual reports and audit programmes. On the 
completion of all the interviews, the full data-set was analysed using qualitative procedures. 
The open coding technique suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998) was adopted at the initial 
stage of the data analysis. Using this technique, issues, actions, interactions and key concepts 
were identified through careful reading of the interview transcripts, documents, notes and 
reflections of the context in which they occurred. The interview transcripts and documents 
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were therefore scrutinised to identify statements or discourses that reflected the perceptions 
and views surrounding the activities of internal auditors in supporting good governance. 
 
Subsequently, these emergent analytical codes were arranged into the categories suggested by 
the data. In developing categories to make sense of this data, attention was given to the 
actions, the meaning underlying those actions and the wider phenomena to which these 
actions responded and which they shaped (Silverman, 2001). Categories are concepts, derived 
from data that stand for phenomenon or abstract explanatory terms (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Emerging patterns or themes were also derived through comparative analysis, which is the act 
of finding similarities and differences in the data by comparing conceptually similar events, 
incidents or issues with those previously coded.  These data were arranged according to the 
emerging themes and only finalised after careful reading and repeated discussion among 
authors of this paper (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). 
 
Due to the potential confidentiality of the matters discussed and the anonymity of 
participants, in the findings that follow in section 5, quotes extracted from the interviews are 
only be referred to by the respondent number which was assigned randomly. Responses have 
also been gender neutralised to further safeguard the anonymity of participants.  
 
5. Findings: Internal Auditor Roles in Governance 
 
The findings are presented in two main sections that consider the dual aspects of a 
compliance role and an enabling role of internal audit. Throughout, these findings are 
supported by verbatim quotations from the interviews, anonymously denoted using AE in 
reference to the respective participants. Firstly, we consider the compliance role and internal 
audit’s function in upholding rules and regulations. This is then extended beyond compliance 
into service delivery and the image of the LGA. Here, tensions may be evident through 
concerns over managerial control, in contrast to internal audit independence and professional 
competence. This is manifested in the level of audit activity and the acceptability to 
management of associated internal audit recommendations. Secondly, we consider the 
enabling role of internal auditors in seeking to fulfil performance, as measured by associated 
performance ratings, and to improve public service delivery. Inherent in this, is their belief 
that corporate governance is explicitly to serve the wider public.  
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5.1 Government Rules and Internal Auditing Activities  
Government rules and internal auditing activities are designed to support effective 
governance processes. This includes conformance to rules for the prevention of malpractice, 
to assist performance by management in public service delivery and to help them protect 
organisational image. These activities not only legitimate rules and management actions, but 
the internal audit profession itself. 
 
In relation to the importance of external rules, the most common reason cited in the 
interviews, is their crucial role in preventing the misuse of power and wastage of public 
money. The importance of the treasury circular as providing the main rules that guide the 
internal audit activities is therefore widely shared by the interviewees in this study, 
exemplified by AE 3 who commented: 
 
‘For internal auditors, rules and regulations such as treasury circulars are like a 
bible!’ 
            
Recognising that the treasury circular has gone through stringent deliberation, the participants 
stressed the need for auditing organisational compliance in accordance with the circular and 
their full implementation in practice. AE 1 was typical of a common response in relation to 
their use and implementation of treasury circulars: 
 
‘The applicability of treasury circulars in public sector organisations has been 
thoroughly studied by the government. So our role as internal auditors is to ensure 
the circulars are implemented accordingly.’ 
            
The treasury circulars are rules that colonise the activities of public sector organisations and 
compliance to the circulars is a form of demonstrating public accountability to the citizen. 
The recognition of the importance of following procedures in relation to the provision of 
public services is encapsulated by AE 2 in their response: 
 
‘Our main role as internal auditors is basically reminding the department to follow 
circulars. The objective of the public sector is to provide (a public interest) service to 
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citizens, so before we do anything, we must ensure we follow the right procedures and 
consider the impact on citizens.’ 
       
Whilst the above quotes are evidence of the public sectors’ internal auditors reference and 
adherence to the treasury circular, they also suggested that the underlying motivations behind 
the reliance was in protecting the wellbeing of citizens. For example, the statements that the 
treasury circular is a bible and that their role is to remind and ensure departments follow the 
circular. Such opinion suggests their tendency to draw the department to acknowledge their 
power in requesting that departments act according to their request. Such requests are a 
strategic action. This is because the shared understandings that all government departments 
shall follow the treasury circular is a common knowledge, hence any department cannot 
easily contest this statement by arguments.  
 
It was apparent that the internal auditors’ focus on compliance audit is expected by the 
management to assist them in discharging their responsibility. However, the participants also 
suggest that they have detached themselves from the traditional view that internal audit is to 
(solely) police other functions. In this vein, one of the interviewees, AE 4, specified 
participation in senior management meetings and the involvement of internal audit in 
activities to improve the quality and corporate image are platforms that enable them to 
exercise the potential communicative action of their works: 
 
‘That internal audit is to find others’ fault is an old concept. Now our role is to assist 
management. For example, management always ask our views on certain issues and 
encourages us to participate in various meetings.’     
 
Indeed, emergent from the interviews, is the recognition of an increasing demand for internal 
auditors to be more involved in improving the governance of the organisation beyond 
assuring compliance with rules and regulations that colonise through coercive institutional 
processes. For example, as AE 5 opined, they are expected, by the senior management, to 
contribute to activities that enhance the quality of public sector delivery and corporate image. 
 
‘Audit is not to find others’ fault. Previously we were police, but now we are involved 
in activities to improve quality and corporate image.’ 
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Hence internal auditors’ contributions in improving corporate image and quality management 
are viewed as recognition to the (professional) skills and competencies of the internal audit 
function. Indeed, AE 9 specifically commented that, ‘by providing recommendations [that] 
can help the auditees to improve their processes’. In order to carry out such roles, as 
management facilitators in improving quality and image, internal auditors develop various 
strategies. For instance, AE 7 referred to the need to ‘mingle with people in order to get 
information’.   
 
However, as internal auditors become enabled, through not only their exhortation of 
recommendations but communicative action, it increases the risk of them becoming more 
under management influence (and even control), especially to legitimate their actions. Indeed 
internal auditors openly recognised the stark reality that auditors could go native with 
management, an issue directly referred to by AE 5.  
 
 
‘Our activities can be pressured by management, and sometimes it would be easy to 
go native, but this has to be resisted… Ultimately if pressure was unreasonable and 
management would not relent then the CAE would have to inform the HMC (Head of 
Municipal Council) or even Auditor General, in line with the statutory duty of internal 
audit. Obviously no one would want this…’ 
 
As such, internal audit may become regarded as legitimating management actions, and even 
more so internal audit may begin to set the management agenda by making their 
recommendations instrumental and therefore more likely to be accepted. Internal auditors 
therefore need to carefully mediate this potentiality and look to maintain their independence. 
Less one set of colonizing governance rules are replaced with a new and more direct master. 
Indeed, there was clear recognition of the need to maintain internal audit independence and of 
the audit processes performed. One of the participants, AE 18, framed this independence of 
the audit process and management recognition as follows:  
 
‘I don’t feel that our activities are being controlled by the management. Indeed we 
can simply report on anything……in one of the audits we found that the Mayor’s 
office did not have an organisational chart, we included this as part of our audit 
observation and the Mayor was happy that we do not close our eyes on his activities.’ 
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‘So far we have got very good support from management and the Mayor. I think 
because they can see that we can help them to deliver a good service to the 
public……sometimes we have heads of departments request us to audit their 
activities. For example, one of the departments asked us to audit the landscape 
activities because they faced problems with their contractors….so they asked us to 
audit the activities to confirm their observations’ (i.e. whether the problems are 
caused by the department or the contractor). 
            
Nevertheless, the emancipatory role of internal audit is influenced by the professional 
judgement of an individual internal auditor. For example, AE 13 comments on the need to 
exercise their discretion in dealing with misappropriation of assets in the LGA: 
 
‘In a misappropriation case … I don’t trust anybody except myself….that’s my 
way…now I am investigating something…and the deputy HMC happens to know…but 
I will not show him the details…because until I can gather sufficient evidence to 
implicate the individual, I would not share anything with anyone including my HMC.’ 
            
Whilst the internal auditor may be appreciative of senior management input on an ongoing 
investigation, there is a need, consistent with their independence, to withhold the preliminary 
information in order to ensure that a complete case is presented to the management for further 
actions. AE 13 also explained that in the case of misuse of position for personal benefits or 
misappropriation of assets, the most difficult task is not obtaining the evidence but dealing 
with the negative perceptions on their role as an internal auditor. The emotional feeling of 
putting a co-worker through disciplinary actions, or the perception of other colleagues on 
their perceived lack of sympathy to the family members of the alleged perpetrator are the 
main challenges that need to be overcome.  
 
However, whilst treasury circulars were often lauded by the participants as to their standing 
(as evidenced earlier) the associated rules are not always clear cut for implementation at the 
localised operational level. As a result, in some instances, internal auditors need to exercise 
discretion as to what is an acceptable and unacceptable activity. For example, providing 
recommendations is not simply requiring the organisation to comply with rules or procedures, 
but it is within these activities that internal auditors exercise their professional judgment in 
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exhorting recommendations and extending this in communicative action. As suggested by AE 
6 below, making a recommendation is a process to convince the senior management that 
compliance with government procedures is crucial for the governance of LGAs and a failure 
to do so may attract public complaints. 
 
‘To make audit findings acceptable to an auditee or to attract their attention, we must 
have convincing arguments, say for example, if you don’t do this, the risk will be 
(x)…, or we highlight the rules and regulation, maybe senior management overlooked 
that… but the purpose is for us to help each other to improve our quality of services 
to the public.’ 
           
This is illustrative of how acceptability is an important criteria in determining communicative 
action. The internal auditor needs to make a convincing argument and demonstrate the 
consequences of not following rules and regulations as a claim of validity for their 
recommendation. While the internal auditor refers to the established norm, through the rules, 
in the case of providing a recommendation, the clients can criticise the claim of validity 
through arguments such as the suitability of implementing their recommendation within the 
client’s context. 
 
This also reveals that providing recommendations as an activity becomes more challenging 
for internal auditors. For instance, senior management in the LGA may no longer appreciate 
recommendations that only solve the problem in the short term. Internal audit 
recommendations would be perceived as adding value if they are practical, prevent the 
recurrence of the problem in the long term, and could give positive impact to the citizen in 
the public interest. In order to provide perceived value added recommendations, AE 6 and 
their team discussed with auditees possible solutions to the problem as part of communicative 
action. Hence they advise, ‘the auditee to do the job in the right way and not just based on 
existing practices… you know… what they need to do based on an act or guidelines’.  
 
Based on their experience, auditees have usually thought of the solutions but these were not 
implemented due to financial and non-financial constraints. This is more often experienced 
by the municipal LGA’s that are located in areas that have a relatively lower level of financial 
resource and income generating activities. Such LGAs need to prioritise their budget and 
often the maximum amount of financial resources will be channelled to the departments that 
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provide direct impact services to society such as the town planning department than a 
backstage function such as the finance department. As a result of this, internal auditors 
emphasise and extend the recommendations that have the highest likelihood of being 
implemented by the respective LGA. The discussion between auditors and auditees in 
determining a suitable solution to the problem is a process that can lead to the acceptability of 
the recommendation and constitutes communicative action. This shows that communicative 
action is a way to promote human emancipation as through this process both internal auditors 
and clients work towards reaching shared understandings within the confines of the LGA. 
 
By incorporating potential management solutions in their audit recommendations, 
participants sought to create the expectation that their recommendations would be 
implemented. This extended exhortations beyond a mere compliance role and sought to 
improve both the system control for conformance but also potentially business performance. 
The audit recommendations therefore are not a normatively authorised action, by way of 
internal auditors having a policing power, but a communicative action that enables 
management to know what to do, how to do it, and negotiate possible appropriate actions in 
governing the organisation. Take for instance the following two responses:   
 
‘As (internal) auditors we are not ‘only’ to highlight the errors or wrongdoings of 
others, we have to show the right ways of performing their tasks. For example, when I 
came in, staff didn’t really know the right information to include in a LO (Local 
Order). So I labelled the right information in each column and wrote down 
instructions on how to fill in the LO, then I scanned the sample LO, did a memo and 
emailed them to the staff copying in my HMC.’ 
           (AE 3) 
 
‘We found that many auditees did not know how to properly fill in the CP67 form and 
some did not present the form (when reporting the revenue collection). So we told the 
Human Resource Department to organise a training event and it was delivered by our 
CAE.’ 
           (AE 18) 
 
While the act of telling the human resource department to conduct training constitutes 
linguistically mediated open strategic action, the act of writing down the instructions to fill in 
 
 
23 
a Local Order is an example of a co-ordinated action to encourage acceptability of the 
instruction and thus constitutes communicative action. The internal auditor’s effort to 
demonstrate the right information to include in a Local Order and to conduct training on how 
to fill in the CP67 form is an extension of an exhorted recommendation through 
communicative action that helps with the lack of knowledge on the subject matter. By this act 
of educating the organisational members on the right ways to do their job it not only 
encourages compliance to government rules, but for management action to transform the 
operation or even emancipate some workers from the procedure. In addition, the auditor 
moving from conformance to also embrace performance further legitimates their professional 
role as being more advisory as a helper than just a watchdog. 
 
5.2 On an Enabling Role of Internal Auditors 
Emergent from the interviews, was that the enabling role of internal auditors involved a focus 
on quality tools and performance management system star ratings and rankings. This was in 
the name of the potential of exhortations to improve public service delivery serving to 
legitimate internal audit’s own activities for communicative action. The alternative overt 
public measurement mechanism covers the number of complaints on LGA (and also non-
LGA) services. More broadly, internal audit supports corporate governance mechanisms 
serving to ensure public services for the population. Consistent with this, AE 10 commented 
that the focus of their audit activities on improving the work processes is designed to help 
control the quality of its service delivery. This relates public service delivery to the current 
government tag line:  
 
‘Since now the government’s aspiration is to ensure ‘Citizen First’, so I try to align 
my audit activities toward that idea.’  
            
 
The importation of management control systems from private sector organisations into public 
sector organisations is one of the common features of NPM. Local authorities in Malaysia are 
not left behind in this regard. Further, the regulatory authorities that monitor the performance 
of local authorities formulate their own monitoring tools such as an Accountability Index 
developed by the Auditor General and a STAR rating developed by the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government. Internally, most of the interviewees are involved in activities related 
to operation of quality standard tools such as International Organization for Standardization 
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(ISO) and the Japanese workplace organisation system 5S (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, and 
Shitsuke) in their respective LGAs. The level of monitoring practices and the link to 
performance was highlighted by AE 1 as follows: 
 
‘We also have 5S and ISOs that provide extra guidelines to us. So the government 
have sufficient rules and procedures to guide us, just we need to ensure the 
improvement in work practices.’       
           
Whilst these guidelines are primarily designed to regulate organisational activities, the 
interviewee positively suggests that such guidelines will be used to improve the 
organisational practice and not be constrained by them. Following this, some interviewees 
use the third party control tools in shaping their scope of audit. This is possible because most 
of these guidelines share common criteria. For example, public sector financial management 
is one of the criteria stated in both the Accountability Index and Star Rating and is also an 
important audit area identified in the treasury circular. AE 6 for instance uses STAR rating 
components in deciding their audit priorities. The STAR rating comprises comprehensive 
indicators to measure LGAs performance including measures such as the existence of 
strategic planning, commitment towards quality and creativity, ICT, and public sector 
management and financial management.  
 
For the majority of our interviewees, the STAR rating is seen to have a significant influence 
on the image of LGAs. While ensuring a high rating is the responsibility of everyone 
involved with the LGA, internal auditors are expected by LGA management to play an active 
role in providing recommendations to help improve the rating. Although all interviewees 
suggest that STAR rating has a positive effect on organisational performance, they argued 
that this has increased their job scope significantly. This is a challenge to the internal audit 
function as many interviewees face headcount and budgetary issues. Too many types of 
audits not only put more pressure on the financial constraints faced by LGAs but also confuse 
the organisational members on the reasons behind such audits. Thus, some internal auditors 
use their discretion and judgment to organise their work around STAR rating requirements. 
As many organisational members are sceptical about the benefits that these audits can do for 
their organisation, aligning internal audit activities with these audits is an attempt to 
encourage organisational members to further debate and suggest priority areas for audit and 
enable acceptability of the audit function in enhancing organisational image. Based on the 
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rating received in each category of performance, AE 6 for example will focus their internal 
audit activities on the areas which receive poor scoring. They argued: 
 
‘When we have indicators (referring to STAR indicators) that were recognized 
throughout Malaysia, so this is a measure of quality. Say a LGA has got two stars, the 
public will say ‘yeah we know that this LGA is bad’ … so the LGA’s image will be 
affected and staff morale will be low.’ 
 
‘Since we have a Malaysian standard, so I thought why not align my internal audit 
activities with the activities related to the STAR rating.’ 
            
This view is also supported by AE 12 who has been using both the STAR rating and 
Accountability Index as guides to determine audit areas, who explained:  
 
‘In 2008 our performance in accountability audit conducted by the Auditor General 
was embarrassing. We were the second last in terms of ranking among LGAs in our 
state. So in 2012, we did a pre-audit (self-assessment) before the accountability audit 
and provided recommendations and in that year our ranking rose significantly… you 
know the Auditor General in the exit conference was really impressed with the way we 
transformed.’          
 
The activities of AE 6 and AE 12 both reflect the ways in which internal auditors perform 
their function in an enabling way to improve rankings and ratings. Whilst compliance with 
the various government circulars is the backbone of this function, they embrace their work by 
aligning internal audit activities with the operational priorities. This creates greater consensus 
of common activities that can serve to enhance the image of the organisation. By using the 
STAR rating and Accountability Index elements in selecting their audit areas it enables 
communicative action with other members in the organisation to further legitimate the 
perceived value of audit to their operations.    
 
However, this internal audit focus on external ranking criteria for LGA image as a way to 
legitimate the usefulness of internal audit activities to management is not without potential 
unintended consequences. For instance, with changed audit activity and associated 
measurable outputs, the focus of attention may mean other areas are neglected. In essence, 
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internal audit activities should not be compromised as an instrumental action driven by 
ratings as a means to legitimate their own existence. This is not to say that the underlying 
performance management systems are inherently poor or that internal auditors are wrong to 
give them attention, but more so to highlight that internal auditors should be able to use their 
professional judgment to determine their activities.  
 
As the third tier of government that provides direct services to the general public, corporate 
governance in LGAs has been generally understood by our interviewees as a system to 
provide good services to citizens and ensure actions are in the public interest. For instance, 
AE 8 clearly noted that, ‘good corporate governance means making sure there are good 
services for citizens’. One indicator of good services to citizens is the number of complaints 
received by the LGAs. In this context, AE 5 explains the experience of their LGA,  
 
‘To me, the management of complaints is the measure of our performance. Therefore 
our role as auditors is to do a random audit on the management of complaints once 
every three months.’ 
           
Complaints on services provided by LGAs are also monitored closely by the council 
members (local politicians) and are one of the permanent agenda items in LGAs monthly full 
council meeting. In each LGA there is a team to monitor the management of complaints and 
an internal auditor is one of the standing team members. The importance of managing public 
complaints as an indicator of good governance is acknowledged by all of our interviewees. 
For instance, AE 12 explains that sometimes public complaints might not be within the LGAs 
administration. For example, the drainage system is under the jurisdiction of the Irrigation 
and Drainage Department which is a department under the Federal Government. However 
since LGAs collect tax, the public assume that any infrastructure issues shall be directed to 
the municipal council. AE 12 comments:  
 
‘We cannot ignore the complaint although we are not responsible for it. We have to 
show that we care for our citizens by quickly channelling complaints to relevant 
departments.’          
 
Recognising the importance of public complaints to the image and standing of LGA’s, from 
an internal audit perspective, AE 12 explained:  
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‘We focus on work procedures because this is the key that could reduce the public 
complaints.’          
 
Whilst it is recognised that internal auditors still ensure compliance to rules (in their 
watchdog role), the above quotes suggest that internal auditors regard an important part of 
their audit activities to be geared towards improving the quality of public sector delivery (in a 
helper role) and to uphold organisation reputation (in their protector role). However, this is 
not merely to help and protect management, but is partly to legitimate internal audit activities 
themselves in an instrumental manner. This is especially the case in Malaysia where internal 
audit function activities in LGAs are still at their infancy, particularly in municipal councils 
outside Kuala Lumpur and Selangor (its neighbouring state). In general, our interviewees 
recognised that their ability to exhort recommendations, but with a need for communicative 
action with management to extend the recommendations into action, has therefore been 
influenced by the contextual conditions. These include physical infrastructure, human 
resources capacity and budgetary constraints, which limits the scope of audit they can 
perform in a year, and managerial perceptions on the internal audit roles. AE 13 highlighted 
the issue of capacity faced by their audit team: 
 
‘We don’t have enough staff, but the problem with this LGA is that we can’t recruit 
more people…even to get contract staff… so we have to double or triple our efforts to 
complete audit assignments.’ 
 
Beyond this, their recognition of audit capacity constraints suggested some areas are more 
demanding for internal auditing. For instance, when an audit examines wider technical issues 
of engineering aspects related to infrastructural works that go beyond the knowledge of 
accountants and auditors. To deal with such issues, CAEs enrol other department specialists, 
such as engineers and quantity surveyors, to help on such assignments. This is an example of 
communicative action that has coordinated interaction between the internal auditors and other 
organisational members. The same practice also was enacted by another interviewee from a 
city council (AE14). This interviewee suggested that enrolling officers from different 
departments to commission some technical audit tasks would help to tackle the issue of lack 
of resources within the internal audit department as well as to increase their appreciation on 
the role of internal auditors as an exhorter to the management.  
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6. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
Employing a Habermasian frame, it has been argued that public services activities have been 
colonised by accounting that permeates all aspects of work. This has affected professionals 
and the way they behave, including internal auditors. In supporting good governance, it was 
found that internal auditors legitimise their position through dual roles; compliance 
(watchdog) and performance (helper and protector) audits. It was illustrated in the research 
that governance processes carried out by internal auditors were primarily to prevent 
malpractice through compliance audit to rules that colonised practices. Further, such 
processes helped to assist management in improving public service delivery and upholding 
corporate image. However such processes also raised issues that risked internal auditors 
becoming (more) beholden to management.  
 
In performing these roles, internal auditor actions had intended and unintended consequences. 
A compliance audit can, as intended, reduce the amount of malpractice and help ensure rules 
are followed. However, it may become instrumental and not focus on the broader concerns 
outside of the specific confines of rules and thus potentially waste resource by auditing 
activities that are considered trivial. In terms of public service delivery, the audit could be 
intentionally used to focus on areas to improve rankings. However, this instrumentalism 
could have unintended consequences by focussing on work processes that lead to a focus on 
procedures rather than outcomes, and thus lack concentration on areas that are not measured 
but could have (serious) service implications. With regards to improving corporate image, the 
audit could instrumentally focus on areas to achieve a better reputation and reduced 
complaints. However, such actions may also have unintended consequences of only 
addressing LGA complaints for those that have an active voice and thereby not helping the 
majority of citizens. For complaints on non-LGA services it may use up time without 
achieving any genuine joined up services.   
 
These dual roles (compliance and performance) also have greater consequences on the 
professional identity of the internal auditor. As we have illustrated, in the attempts to 
convince the management to comply with rules and to adopt performance improvement ideas, 
internal auditors will suggest possible solutions to the problem, hence assuming the guise of a 
wider management role. This can possibly be an identity threat to the internal auditors’ 
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independence and could cause internal auditors to carry out jouissance [possessive] acts 
(Kosmala & Herrbach, 2006). Nevertheless, the internal auditors in this study took a more 
critical approach in dealing with the issue of professional identity. Instead of being captured 
by the rules and beholden to management needs, they opted to convince management by 
providing reasons to support the validity of their work. This also allows the management to 
respond in a more reflective approach by way of debate, criticism and arguments on 
practicality and socio-economic dimension of the auditors’ recommendation.  
 
Within this study, critical theory is the key to getting into the rich, mundane and yet complex 
fabric of everyday life such as the internal auditors’ efforts to balance conformance and 
performance. In the context of communicative actions, internal auditors accept the position 
that their professional authority to impose rules in organisations cannot be simply exercised 
without having practical intervention to avoid loss of meaning in everyday social life (Edgar, 
2006). This has been seen, for instance, in the context of providing recommendations on the 
managements’ compliance to external rules and the various forms of quality audit, where 
internal auditors contextualise their activities according to the mutually recognised needs of 
the organisation. Similarly, this is also evident in the act of not disclosing the ongoing audit 
of sensitive information even to top management. This not only seeks to preserve the 
auditor’s independence, but also to prevent unintended actions that may undermine wider 
moral and psychological issues. Further, the auditor’s choice of linguistic strategic actions is 
not to distort the communication to the management, but to provide better reasons for validity 
claims and acceptability of the information when full evidence is obtained. 
 
While most of the internal auditors’ activities stem from linguistically mediated strategic 
actions, with the aim to shape management behaviours according to their will, the present 
study noted that in most cases internal auditors would resort to communicative action. 
Internal auditors therefore uphold rules, but enable potential for pockets of change through 
their exhortations and communicative action that could have transformation and even 
emancipation potential. For example, there could be changes to rules in a functional business 
area or a change to a measure in the ranking indices.  
 
From the findings in this paper, we agree with Roussy (2013) that internal auditors can be 
watchdogs (compliance audit of rules), helpers (with making recommendations on public 
service delivery) and protectors (by addressing complaints). However, we also suggest that 
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these roles are only possible as internal auditors legitimate their own actions by their 
professional experience to exhort recommendations that can be extended through 
communicative action with management who have the power to transform and emancipate. 
Internal auditors therefore are fundamentally ‘exhorters’, with their strengths and weaknesses 
in power lying in ‘communicative action’ which relies on legitimation of their own 
‘professional’ status. 
 
The findings of this paper should be read in the context of a developing country that still lags 
behind in terms of physical resources to support the internal audit function in their role as a 
mechanism of good governance. The findings show that issues of head count and budgetary 
allocation indeed limit the internal auditor role in supporting the LGA governance. The issue 
of LGAs’ capacity are further magnified by various types of audits conducted by the external 
agencies such as the STAR rating audit and Accountability audit. While the essences of these 
audits are understandable attempts at improving governance and public delivery services of 
LGAs, they also put pressure on the limited financial and technical capacities available in the 
LGAs. Indeed, the findings have highlighted potential consequences of the various external 
agencies audit on the internal audit scope of work as well as the ways in which they prioritise 
their audit areas. This is a typical challenge in the auditing field more generally (Johnson, 
2006). Although, this is a challenge to the internal audit function, some auditors embraced 
this challenge by enrolling members of other functional units such as the engineering 
department to auditing areas that require non-audit expertise.  
 
Our study contributes to the existing literature on internal auditing in three ways. Firstly, we 
show the ways in which internal auditors mobilised the concept of good governance in their 
roles (Tremblay & Gendron, 2011). We suggest internal auditors rely on their exhortation and 
extension through communicative action in supporting governance of LGAs. Secondly, 
following the increased concern with corporate governance and accountability in the public 
sector more generally (Ahrens & Ferry, 2015; Bovens et al., 2014; Ferry & Ahrens, 2016; 
Ferry et al., 2015a, b; Grossi & Pianezzi, 2016), this study provides empirical evidence of the 
development, and challenges faced, in public sector practice in the context of a developing 
country, in our case, Malaysia (and see Ferry et al., 2014; Ferry et al., 2017). Thirdly, our 
study provides micro-level perspectives of how exhortations as recommendations can be 
extended by practices of internal auditors in supporting governance of local authorities 
(Masquefa et al., 2016). This was through communicative action for potential management 
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action, which could even transform and emancipate from humble everyday origins. Indeed, 
the present study shows how internal auditors and management discuss, negotiate and argue 
for solutions to the problem that can enhance their accountability to the public. For example, 
knowing merely how to fill out a local order form may appear to be part of everyday ordinary 
activities. However such actions collectively have important consequences to governance in 
the public sector that can be as significant as a transformation manual or circular that aims to 
standardise behaviour in the public sector. This study thereby complements prior studies that 
have mainly focussed on the potential of accounting as being emancipatory at a broader 
macro-level (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003, 2006).  
 
We recognise that the study is limited by its specific examination of Malaysia, which whilst a 
developing country, has its own cultural, political, economic and social influences. Further, 
we recognise that the findings of the research are limited to the specific region of Peninsular 
West Malaysia, and within that, the focus upon the larger tiers of LGAs; city and municipal 
councils. Whilst this enabled consistency of regulatory environment, the scope of the research 
is necessarily restricted. As such, the study is inherently limited in its generalisability for 
Malaysia. Further, despite the adoption of NPM as a framework by developing countries, 
such as Malaysia, we recognise that other developing countries with NPM practices will often 
have different local rules and regulations within which country specific studies should be set. 
Thus, future studies could contrast the experience of Malaysia with other developing 
countries to examine if there is a broader consensus on the public sector governance issues 
faced in such a context.   
 
We also appreciate that our analysis is mainly derived from interviews with CAEs. We 
recognise this is just one voice in the process of governance and thus may be subject to bias 
or other self-serving motivations. By assuring anonymity and by interviewing across a 
section of LGAs we sought to minimise this potential weakness in research method. 
Additional insight may be obtained in future research by extending the inquiries to include 
politicians, senior management, members of audit committees, protest groups, and citizens 
which supports calls for more research on public sector governance and accountability 
(Ahrens & Ferry, 2015; Ahrens & Ferry, 2016; Almquist, Grossi, van Helden, & Reichard, 
2013; Ferry & Ahrens, 2016). Finally, it is our interpretative framework that has allowed us 
to develop these insights, based on the CAE interviews, informed through Habermas. Whilst 
we sought to ensure the reliability of our findings we accept the ‘fallacy of internalism’ 
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(Ferguson, 2007) of our own analysis and would also welcome alternative ontological 
approaches that could be used to frame future studies.  
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